Independence: The case for compromise
Scottish politics is in deadlock over a path to independence but a deal is within our reach if we all have courage
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Scotland is stuck. It has been for a while. Nobody really expects it to become unstuck any time soon. Being stuck has come to define our politics, dictating every action and inaction. Stuck is who we are. Stuck is what we do.
The fortunes of Scotland’s political parties rise and fall. This creates an illusion of movement. And yet on the fundamental question of independence, which underpins all of Scottish politics, movement feels implausible.
Another way is possible. Unstuck is a possibility open to us. We may choose not to embrace that possibility. We may chose stuck. Some people find stuck convenient. It pays a lot of wages. It upholsters a lot of comfort zones.
Nevertheless, Scotland can become unstuck if it wants to.
I am going to put the case for unstuck, the case for a compromise where both sides can agree a legal and constitutional path to Scottish independence.
I know this sounds hard. It feels like a risk. Each side has to move from deeply-dug trenches they currently inhabit. And yet a compromise is possible that suits the long-term strategic interests of both sides, as well as Scotland as a whole.
A landmark moment in Scottish political history is within our grasp. Scotland unstuck.
Unrealistic? Pie in the sky? Well, the neighbours seem capable of doing it. Why not us?
Some of the best political journalism I read last year was about the Good Friday Agreement, the deal that paved the way for peace in Northern Ireland. The document was signed on May 22, 1998, and the 25th anniversary was marked by some very fine articles, podcasts and interviews. For an overview I recommend a New Statesman podcast by Ailbhe Rea. Interviews with prominent figures from the peace talks by the Leading podcast are also worth a listen, not least the one with Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams.
Again and again when listening to these men - they were mostly men - I found myself reading across to Scotland’s own constitutional impasse. Sure, the big difference is nobody has died for the cause of Scottish nationalism for quite a few centuries. And yet the similarities were undeniable.
Not so much in the constitutional detail, although there are technical lessons to be learned from the Good Friday process. What was more striking was the psychological similarities.
The so-called “Ulsterisation of Scotland” is overstated. Scottish politics is more fluid than the politics of Northern Ireland, with more movement between Yes and No than either side would care to acknowledge. Nevertheless some common characteristics seem undeniable. The division in Scotland can at times feel feel sectarian, in the sense of a conflict between two sects. Independence and the Union can feel like two belief systems.
A question formed in my my mind while considering the Good Friday Agreement. Some of these men were, at one stage, trying to kill each other. If they were capable of sitting down and hammering out a compromise, why couldn’t we in Scotland do the same?
Was our constitutional difference more entrenched? Was the personal enmity between our two sides deeper? Were our traditions and cultural characteristics more of a barrier to progress? Were Scots more attached to their constitutional preferences than Ulster loyalists or Irish republicans? Were we more fundamentalist in our convictions than Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness?
My answer to all these questions was no. And yet on the defining question of Scottish politics - the potential break-up of Britain - the two sides are today further apart today than they were half a century ago, when Margaret Thatcher said she would not stand in the way of a Scottish public that wanted to leave the UK.
At present there is no agreed path Scotland could take to independence. A democratic wish for Scotland to become sovereign has no agreed remedy in law. The necessary legislative steps are absent. A legitimate constitutional process is unavailable. A peaceful means of fulfilling a popular mandate is missing.
We can change that.
For some years now I have been banging on in my Times column about how Scotland can learn from the Northern Ireland experience. Not just from the remarkable spirit of compromise and consensus, important though this is. We can also borrow from the specific piece of UK law that emerged from the Good Friday Agreement: the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
This week a landmark piece of academic work was published by two of the most interesting people in Scottish politics. Kezia Dugdale was leader of Scottish Labour from 2015-17. Stephen Noon was chief strategist of the Yes Scotland campaign during the 2014 referendum. Together they have published a paper under the auspices of the Centre for Public Policy at the University of Glasgow that, among other things, calls for a Northern Ireland-style compromise on a future referendum on Scottish independence.
This is an idea whose time has come.
I am delighted these political heavyweights have weighed in because to be honest I was losing heart. I first wrote about this five years ago, in August 2019.
Forgive me for quoting the column here in full, but it covers a lot of ground.
I have a suggestion. It is imperfect but may have its uses. Hear me out, and we may be able to break the impasse between Holyrood and Westminster over a new referendum on Scottish independence.
Positions on a second independence referendum have hardened. The UK government stance has shifted from “now is not the time” to something like “over my dead body”. Meanwhile, the first minister has declared that next year there will be a new vote on breaking up Britain, perplexing even her most loyal supporters. They wonder how this will be possible if the Tories are still in power.
The debate, insofar as there is one, is marbled with mistrust. Two opposing, incompatible positions are calcifying. The stand-off is souring Holyrood-Westminster relations and undermining any constructive engagement. Is there a way through this? I think there might be. It involves learning lessons from elsewhere in the UK and adopting an approach that is already HM government policy in another context. In short, it means importing an aspect of the Good Friday agreement into Scottish politics.
I am talking specifically about the provision for a border poll on Irish reunification. In the Good Friday agreement there are three key elements to this, all of which could be applied to Scotland.
First, the UK government recognises “the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland”.
Second, the UK government’s Northern Ireland secretary must order a referendum on Irish unity “if at any time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom”.
Third, the go-ahead for such a poll should not be given “earlier than seven years after the holding of a previous poll”. In practice, this means the gap would be more like nine or ten years between votes, given the amount of preparatory work required between a decision and polling day.
These three principles have been codified in UK legislation for two decades now. They have many virtues. They demonstrate mutual respect between two governments, each of which can claim democratic legitimacy. They entrench the right of the people to decide their own future. And they acknowledge, through the role given to the secretary of state, the UK government’s legacy position as a unitary state.
They also address one of the big flaws in the Edinburgh agreement of 2012 that prepared the ground for Scotland’s independence referendum: the lack of a defined time period between referendums, to allow breathing space in between.
Now, I accept that the Good Friday agreement leaves questions unanswered. How do you accurately measure public opinion? Opinion polls? If so, how many would be required, over what period of time, and with what degree of majority? Do you use a census question to test opinion instead? And just how much discretion does the Northern Ireland secretary have in these matters?
All these uncertainties would be imported into Scottish politics if the Good Friday agreement approach was adopted here. Yet at least there would be some ground rules, and the right of Scots to determine their own future would be front and centre. Any foot-dragging by UK ministers would be open to legal challenge. It would be a ladder down which the UK government could climb from its unsustainable position of refusing a new vote under any circumstances, in defiance of the will of the Scottish parliament. The fig leaf would be consistency. If UK legislation allows the people of Northern Ireland to have self-determination then why not the people of Scotland? Surely there should be parity of esteem between these two component parts of the United Kingdom?
For the SNP, importing the Good Friday protocols would provide clarity and structure, setting out a legitimate path to a new vote at a time when some nationalists are advocating illegitimate means. It would give Nicola Sturgeon a get-out from her rash — some would say cynical — promise that 2014 was a “once in a generation” vote. It would establish the principle, challenged by some impatient nationalists, that a vote should only go ahead once there is clear and sustained evidence of a majority for independence. This would help Ms Sturgeon quell the constant demand from hotheads for one more heave right now.
From the point of view of neutrals in this constitutional war of attrition there is much to commend these rules of engagement. They could remove some of the poison that has crept into London-Edinburgh relations. By codifying the process of getting to a referendum, they could free up both sides to engage with less suspicion and rancour.
As I say, my suggestion is imperfect. It would require both sides of this binary divide to consent to things they find distasteful. The question Scotland needs to ask itself is this: if Northern Ireland can put aside its differences and agree a common framework, why can’t we?
This week I was delighted to be invited on to BBC Scotland’s Debate Night programme where I was able to amplify this argument. By a happy coincidence this was also the day Kez and Stephen unveiled their excellent paper.
Will it make a difference? I do not underestimate the challenge. But I believe this moment can be an inflection point in the long debate about Scottish self-determination.
In this post I will make a Nationalist case for compromise and a Unionist case for compromise.
Let us look at the Nationalists first.
The Nationalist case for compromise
When your path is blocked by a brick wall, what do you do? Borrow a ladder? Tunnel underneath? Or just stand there banging your head repeatedly against the brickwork?
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